1. 16 May, 2014 1 commit
    • yangguo@chromium.org's avatar
      Decouple CpuFeatures from serializer state. · fe243379
      yangguo@chromium.org authored
      Traditionally, we cross compile a snapshot iff the serializer is enabled.
      This will change in the future.
      
      Changes:
       - CpuFeatures probing is done once per process, depending on whether we
         cross compile.
       - CpuFeatures are consolidated into the platform-independent assembler.h
         as much as possible.
       - FLAG_enable_<feature> will only be checked at probing time (already the
         case for ARM).
       - The serializer state is cached by the MacroAssembler.
       - PlatformFeatureScope is no longer necessary.
       - CPUFeature enum values no longer map to CPUID bit fields.
      
      R=svenpanne@chromium.org
      
      Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/285233010
      
      git-svn-id: https://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@21347 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
      fe243379
  2. 06 May, 2014 1 commit
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  22. 10 Sep, 2013 2 commits
    • bmeurer@chromium.org's avatar
      Introduce a RandonNumberGenerator class. Refactor the random/private_random... · eb381b94
      bmeurer@chromium.org authored
      Introduce a RandonNumberGenerator class. Refactor the random/private_random uses in Isolate/Context.
      
      The RandomNumberGenerator is a pseudorandom number generator
      with 48-bit state. It is properly seeded using either
      
      (1) the --random-seed if specified, or
      (2) the entropy_source function if configured, or
      (3) /dev/urandom if available, or
      (4) falls back to Time and TimeTicks based seeding.
      
      Each Isolate now contains a RandomNumberGenerator, which replaces
      the previous private_random_seed.
      
      Every native context still has its own random_seed. But this random
      seed is now properly initialized during bootstrapping,
      instead of on-demand initialization. This will allow us to cleanup
      and speedup the HRandom implementation quite a lot (this is delayed
      for a followup CL)!
      
      Also stop messing with the system rand()/random(), which should
      not be done from a library anyway! We probably re-seeded the
      libc rand()/random() after the application (i.e. Chrome) already
      seeded it (with better entropy than what we used).
      
      Another followup CL will replace the use of the per-isolate
      random number generator for the address randomization and
      thereby get rid of the Isolate::UncheckedCurrent() usage in
      the platform code.
      
      TEST=cctest/test-random-number-generator,cctest/test-random
      R=mstarzinger@chromium.org
      
      Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/23548024
      
      git-svn-id: http://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@16612 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
      eb381b94
    • bmeurer@chromium.org's avatar
      Use PAGE_NOACCESS for guard pages in Windows. · 24a0cabd
      bmeurer@chromium.org authored
      Up until now we used PAGE_GUARD for guard pages in Windows, which
      will raise a STATUS_GUARD_PAGE_VIOLATION exception on first access
      and grant regular access afterwards. This behavior is required to
      implement automatic stack checking, or more generally to implement
      applications that monitor the growth of large dynamic data structures.
      
      However, this is not what we want for our guard pages, which are
      used as a security mechanism. What we really want is PAGE_NOACCESS
      here, which is the Windows-equivalent of PROT_NONE that we use on
      all other platforms.
      
      R=cdn@chromium.org
      
      Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/23458022
      
      git-svn-id: http://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@16604 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
      24a0cabd
  23. 05 Sep, 2013 1 commit
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