This is a reland of commit 9d31f866
There were issues with --future flag implications on M1.

Original change's description:
> [rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1)
>
> ... for V8 code space. The feature is currently disabled.
>
> In order to use fast W^X permission switching we must allocate
> executable pages with readable writable executable permissions (RWX).
> However, MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon) prohibits further
> permission changing of RWX memory pages. This means that the code page
> headers must be allocated with RWX permissions too because otherwise
> it wouldn't be possible to allocate a large code page over the freed
> regular code page and vice versa.
>
> When enabled, the new machinery works as follows:
>
> 1) when memory region is reserved for allocating executable pages, the
>    whole region is committed with RWX permissions and then decommitted,
> 2) since reconfiguration of RWX page permissions is not allowed on
>    MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon), there must be no attempts
>    to change them,
> 3) the request to set RWX permissions in the executable page region
>    just recommits the pages without changing permissions (see (1), they
>    were already allocated as RWX and then discarded),
> 4) in order to make executable pages inaccessible one must use
>    OS::DiscardSystemPages() instead of OS::DecommitPages() or
>    setting permissions to kNoAccess because the latter two are not
>    allowed by the MacOS (see (2)).
> 5) since code space page headers are allocated as RWX pages it's also
>    necessary to switch between W^X modes when updating the data in the
>    page headers (i.e. when marking, updating stats, wiring pages in
>    lists, etc.). The new CodePageHeaderModificationScope class is used
>    in the respective places. On unrelated configurations it's a no-op.
>
> The fast permission switching can't be used for V8 configuration with
> enabled pointer compression and disabled external code space because
> a) the pointer compression cage has to be reserved with MAP_JIT flag
>    which is too expensive,
> b) in case of shared pointer compression cage if the code range will
>    be deleted while the cage is still alive then attempt to configure
>    permissions of pages that were previously set to RWX will fail.
>
> This also CL extends the unmapper unit tests with permissions tracking
> for discarded pages.
>
> Bug: v8:12797
> Change-Id: Idb28cbc481306477589eee9962d2e75167d87c61
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3579303
> Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80238}

Bug: v8:12797
Change-Id: I0fe86666f31bad37d7074e217555c95900d2afba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3610433Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80259}